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Summary 
 
This paper complements the cross-country approach by examining the correlates of 
GDP per capita growth acceleration around “significant” public expenditure episodes 
by reorganizing the data around turning points, or “events”. Here we define (i) a 
growth event as an increase in average per capita growth of at least 2 percentage points 
(pp) sustained for 5 years, (ii) fiscal event as an increase in the primary fiscal 
expenditure annual growth rate of approximately 1 pp sustained for 5 years and not 
accompanied by an aggravation of the fiscal deficit beyond 2% of GDP. These 
definitions of events are applied to database of 140 countries (118 developing countries) 
over 1972-2005, providing a summary but encompassing description of “what is in the 
data”.  
 
For this sample, the probability of occurrence of a fiscal event is about 10%, and, for a 
large range of parameter values for the selection of a “significant” event, the probability 
of a growth event once a fiscal event had occurred is in the 22%- 28% range. The 
probability of occurrence of a fiscal event is higher for the bottom half of the income 
distribution of countries, but the probability that this fiscal event is followed by a 
growth event is higher for the third quartile, corresponding to middle income countries 
(which are largely in Latin America). The probability of a fiscal event not followed by a 
growth event is significantly higher for the Middle East and Africa region. 
 
The description of the changes in expenditures components during fiscal events shows 
that, for developing countries, there are notable differences underlying fiscal events 
followed by growth events: they occur under situations of (i) significant lesser deficit, 
(ii) fewer resources devoted to non-interest General Public Services and (iii) shift in 
discretionary expenditures towards Transport & Communication. 
 
After controlling for the growth-inducing effects of positive terms-of-trade shocks and 
of trade liberalization reform, probit estimates indicate that a growth event is more 
likely to occur in a developing country when surrounded by a fiscal event. Moreover, 
the probability of occurrence of a growth event in the years following a fiscal event is 
greater the lower is the associated fiscal deficit, confirming that success of a growth-
oriented fiscal expenditure reform hinges on a stabilized macroeconomic environment 
(through limited primary fiscal deficit). 
 
♣ We thank Jean-François Brun, Antonio Estache and Peter Heller for comments on an 
earlier draft. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
As detailed in World Bank (2007), a renewed focus on fiscal policy and growth 
has spawned a lively debate over demands for greater “fiscal space” to support 
growth.1 However, there is considerable controversy on what a suitable fiscal 
policy package should look like. Is there a trade-off between the objective of 
short-term stabilization and long-run growth? Currently, the debate over fiscal 
policy is cast in terms of “fiscal space” (i.e. availability of a budgetary room to 
spend more on infrastructure and education for example) and sometimes 
“macroeconomic space” (possibility to the government to increase expenditure 
without impairing macroeconomic stability), see Perotti (2007).  
 
As proposed in the recent report to the Development Committee, a growth and 
development oriented fiscal policy must take into account the composition and 
efficiency of public expenditures in a framework that includes country’s 
conditions (level of indebtedness, and other idiosyncratic characteristics like its 
access to international financial markets or, in the case of poor countries, to 
aid). Under this definition, the term “fiscal space” thus refers to a government’s 
ability to undertake spending to enhance economic growth without impairing its 
present and future ability to service its debt. 2 
 
So far the exploration of fiscal space and performance has proceeded along 
three different paths: (i) case studies such as those in the Development 
Committee report where the performance of 12 countries with different 
fiscal/development profiles are contrasted and the complementary high-growth 
case studies for six countries presented to the Development Committee Meeting 
of March 2007 (see World Bank, 2007, and Biletska and Rajaram, 2007); (ii) 
studies of the efficiency of specific public sector expenditures - e.g. the several 
studies on infrastructure (Calderon and Serven, 2003, 2004, 2005)  or on other 
components of social infrastructure (Estache, Gonzales, and Trujillo, 2007), and 
(iii) cross-country growth regressions (see the exhaustive summary proposed in 
Annex 2 of the report for the Development Committee, World Bank, 2007, or 
                                                 
1 As defined in the World Bank interim report (2006, p. 1), “the term [fiscal space] initially 
applied to the view that fiscal deficit targets limited the ability of government to borrow to 
finance productive, growth-enhancing infrastructure projects. The term has now gained wider 
currency, however, and can be seen to refer to constraints to public expenditure which have 
the potential to raise productivity and yield returns in the future [...]”. 
2 Depending on individual circumstances, creating fiscal space can occur by increasing 
borrowing and/or raising revenue mobilization, improving the efficiency of public expenditure, 
and mobilizing more grant aid. The “fiscal space diamonds” used in the interim Report (see 
World Bank, 2006) is a way to visualize differences across countries. The “diamond” presents 
the four main options (raise revenue effort; increase borrowing; increase grant aid; improve 
expenditure efficiency) along four axes departing from coordinates that summarize the country’s 
current fiscal stance. While a pedagogical and informative way to indicate how fiscal space may 
be created, this heuristic is not made easily operational. 
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Perotti, 2007, section 4) in which government expenditures are included among 
the regressors.  
 
This paper complements the cross-country approach by examining the 
correlates between significant public spending “chocs” and growth 
accelerations, reorganizing the data around turning points, or “events” 
(calendar time is transformed into “event time”) 3 . Does a fiscal “event” precede 
a growth “event”? What are the characteristics of such a fiscal event?  
 
We look for “events” in growth along the lines of Hausman, Pritchett and Rodrik 
(2005). Lacking information on milestone events in fiscal reforms similar to 
those available for trade reforms as in Wacziarg and Welch (2003), we define an 
“event” on the fiscal side using a approach similar to the definition of an event 
on the growth side, i.e. we define a “fiscal event” based on conditional changes 
in primary fiscal expenditures. 
 
As explained in the body of the paper, this descriptive analysis faces several 
challenges. First, as already mentioned, in spite of its focus on growth, the 
approach certainly captures the stabilization effects of fiscal policy. Actually, our 
data-constrained definition of fiscal event is based on primary spending that 
includes also non-discretionary spending.  Second, there is arbitrariness in our 
parameterization of fiscal event, implying a careful sensitivity analysis. Third, 
the investigation could be viewed as an exploration of the correlates of primary 
spending choc and growth acceleration and extra care should be exercised when 
interpreting the results. 
 
Keeping these caveats in mind, the paper unfolds as follows. In section 2, we 
discuss the relevance of using an event methodology approach and summarize 
some of our main findings. Section 3 presents the identification conditions of 
both growth and fiscal events (with details and sensitivity analysis left to the 
annex A.3). Section 4 studies the characteristics of growth and fiscal events, and 
the relation between the two. The descriptive analysis computes fiscal event 
(unconditional) probabilities and probabilities that fiscal events are followed (or 
not) by growth events. Section 5 investigate the characteristics of fiscal events, 
in particular the ones followed by a growth event, in terms of geography, 
underlying changes in expenditure composition, and in the level of associated 
primary deficit.  Then the statistical analysis turns on the growth side, the 
objective being to see if, based on probit estimates, growth events are more 
likely to occur in a developing country when surrounded by a fiscal event. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The “events methodology” approach has been used in several areas, notably by Bruno and 
Easterly (1998) for inflation, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) for trade liberalization, and Hausman, 
Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) for growth and investment performance. 
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2.  THE EVENTS METHODOLOGY  
 
Cross-section growth studies have identified that some public expenditures tend 
to be “productive” in the sense of being growth-enhancing. In the “standard 
growth regression” framework, average GDP per capita growth over a decade or 
more is regressed on a set of “standard” control variables augmented by the 
inclusion of public expenditure variables.4 From the perspective of this study, 
among the more interesting recent developments in these exercises, Kneller et 
al., 2000, Bose et al., 2003, and Adam and Bevan, 2005, using dynamic panel, 
have argued persuasively that one should take into account both the sources and 
the uses of funds simultaneously. Taken together, these recent cross-country 
studies find that capital expenditure, as well as spending on education, health, 
transport and communication can be favorable to growth when the government 
budget constraint is taken into account (see World Bank, 2007 - Annex 2). We 
retain from these studies that any analysis of fiscal performance should 
incorporate the government budget constraint to provide for a meaningful 
evaluation of the correlates of public expenditures and its relation with growth. 
 
Moreover, as pointed out in several studies (e.g. Easterly et al., 1993), growth 
tends to be highly instable in low-income countries. This makes it more difficult 
to unveil the relation between growth and its fundamentals. Moreover, as noted 
by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrick  (2005)  “standard growth theory, 
whether of the neoclassical or the endogenous variant, suggests that our best 
bet for uncovering the relation between growth and its fundamentals is to look 
for instances where trend growth experiences a clear shift. [...] If instead we 
lumped together data on growth without paying attention in these turning 
points, we would be averaging out the most interesting variation in the data.”   
 
Here we focus on events that are restricted to GDP growth and primary 
spending growth acceleration (an increase in annual GDP per capita growth of 
at least 2 percentage points and sustained for at least 5 years and on the fiscal 
side to an increase in primary fiscal expenditure). Rather the fiscal event 
captures a change in fiscal stance that likely includes a discretionary component 
that meets certain qualifications seeking to exclude increases in fiscal 
expenditures that could be destabilizing.  
 
As a point of departure, an “events” methodology is purely descriptive. It 
approaches the robustness problem of the correlates between growth and fiscal 
expenditures by focusing on turning points in the data, the turning points being 
defined at discretion. Using threshold values to define events is also a way to 
                                                 
4
 Perotti (2007) reviews critically the contributions of the production function and growth 
regressions emphasizing that the endogeneity of public investment combined with the lack of 
good instruments casts doubts on the robustness of the results. These criticisms apply to the 
events methodology as well when interpreting results.  
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control for some of the fluctuations in the data and to isolate what is under 
study in a more systematic way than, say, in case studies, since the selection is 
over a large sample. Actually, we identify fiscal events over the largest possible 
database including government spending. Moreover, we define conditions on 
fiscal event in order to take into account the government budget constraint: to 
qualify as an event, we impose that the increase in fiscal expenditure growth 
does not occur at the expense of the fiscal deficit.  
 
In sum, while the interpretation of results is subject to caution, this approach 
provides an easy-to-understand exploration of the correlates between fiscal 
policy (here fiscal expenditures) and performance (here per capita GDP 
growth), without imposing a single common linear model for all countries as 
done in cross-countries regressions. When applied to a large database, as is 
done in this study, it gives a more encompassing description of “what is in the 
data” and is thus complementary to the three other approaches mentioned 
above.  
 
The descriptive analysis computes fiscal event (unconditional) probabilities and 
probabilities that fiscal events are followed (or not) by growth events. The 
description of the changes in expenditures during fiscal events shows a shift 
away from Defense, non-interest general expenditure and Transport & 
Communication expenditures towards education, health and Housing & 
Community expenditures. For the developing country group, there are notable 
differences in the evolution of expenditures for fiscal events followed by growth 
events: first fiscal events followed by growth events occur under situations of a 
significant lesser deficit, and a shift in discretionary expenditures towards 
transport & communication is only observed for fiscal events followed by growth 
events. After controlling for the growth-inducing effects of positive terms-of-
trade shocks and of trade liberalization reform, the statistical analysis in which 
the probability of a growth event is conditioned on the occurrence of a fiscal 
event in surrounding years confirms that growth events are, on average, more 
likely when a fiscal event has occurred. Moreover, the probability of occurrence 
of a growth event in the five years following a fiscal event is greater the lower is 
the associated fiscal deficit, confirming that success of a growth-oriented fiscal- 
expenditure package likely hinges on a stabilized macroeconomic environment 
(through limited fiscal deficit). 
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3. DEFINING EVENTS 
 
We are interested in the relation between a “significant” change in fiscal 
spending and a “significant” change in GDP growth - what Hausmann, Pritchett 
and Rodrick  (henceforth HPR, 2005), call “growth acceleration”. Per capita 
GDP growth and primary fiscal expenditures (in GDP %) growth are then our 
two indicator values. Call these growth indicators, z . Average annual changes, 
,t nz , are computed for each year over successive windows of length n . Here, 
because of the limited sample size for the fiscal data (1972 to 2005) we choose a 
succession of windows of 5n =  years. So we compute 
,t nz∆ : 
, , ,t n t t n t t nz z z+ −∆ = −  
If the change 
,t nz∆ in the average indicator value satisfies certain conditions (see 
below), we will say that an “event” has taken place for z in t. The annexes A.1 and 
A.1 describes in detail the sample and annex A.3 reports how we selected the 
parameter values defining an event and how sensitive our sample of events is to 
changes in the conditioning values. Here we summarize the conditions for our 
‘benchmark’ set of parameters starting with GDP per capita growth, and then 
turning to primary fiscal expenditures. In this benchmark case, the sample 
produces 58 growth events and 95 growth events. Sensitivity of the number of 
events to the choice of parameter values is reported in the annex  A.3, table A.4. 
 
Growth events.  A growth event will have taken place in t if the following 
conditions are met: 
   
(i) an increase in the average per-capita growth of 2 ppa or more 
(percentage points per annum, ppa),  
(ii) growth acceleration sustained for at least 5 years [t;t+4], 
(iii) an average annual growth rate at least 3.5 ppa during the acceleration 
period [t;t+4], 
(iv) a post-acceleration output exceeding the pre-episode peak level of 
GDP. 
 
With this selection process, several events could follow one another over 
consecutive years capturing in fact the same event. To select the more “relevant” 
year, we fit a spline regression and choose the year for which the change in 
indicator value is statistically the most significant. Finally, we impose the 
restriction that two events must be separated by at least five years. This method 
is used for both growth and fiscal events.  
 
Here, we strictly follow HPR in their definition of growth acceleration. However, 
since there is considerable variation in growth performance associated with 
terms-of-trade changes, especially for low-income countries (see Easterly et al. 
1993), one might also wish to refine the definition of a growth event to purge 
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from the series the growth accelerations that would be due to changes in the 
terms-of-trade.5 This is done in the statistical analysis of section 5 where we 
control for the impact of changes in the terms-of-trade.  
 
Fiscal Events. The core of this study is the definition of a fiscal event. Ideally, 
we would like to carry out the equivalent of what Wacziarg and Welch (WW, 
2003) have done for trade liberalization episodes, that is use a combination of 
criteria that qualify a fiscal reform to center an event which could then be 
checked against detailed reports identifying significant changes in the fiscal 
regime. In a second step a “before and after” analysis would be carried out 
around the fiscal event for selected outcome indicators (e.g. growth and other 
indicators like investment in the case of WW).  
 
Unfortunately, carrying out a similar exercise for changes in fiscal policy is 
much more difficult. First, as mentioned above, is the issue of trying to 
disentangle the stabilization objective from the growth objective which is not 
addressed here. Second, there is much more fungibility in fiscal policy than in 
trade policy, so it is more difficult to identify the fiscal space levers, and it is 
much more difficult to identify the expected effects of changes in these levers. 
Here, we restrict fiscal reform to a change in total primary fiscal expenditures 
and, in a second step, we study the underlying evolution of many components of 
potential interest (e.g. education, health or transport and communication)  
 
Faced with these limitations and with limited data availability, we rely on 
changes in consolidated central government total fiscal expenditures, TFE 
(taken from the GFS, see details in annex A.1) as “event” changes in government 
expenditures. Since we are looking for autonomous fiscal expenditures, events 
are defined on expenditures purged of non-discretionary components such as 
wages and interest payments, IP .6 Lacking information on the wage component 
for each functional expenditure category, we consider as discretionary TFE 
purged of interest payments. So, we define discretionary fiscal expenditure, 
DFE, asDFE TFE IP= −  which is equivalent to focusing on primary spending. 
We also compute the primary fiscal deficit, def, as the difference between the 
total revenues and grants and the discretionary fiscal expenditure, DFE (so a 
deficit is negative). 
 
As discussed below, for the developing countries in the sample used here, 
average DFE  is 24% of GDP and average central government primary fiscal 
                                                 
5 While HPR also face this problem, because they use an 8-year (rather than a 5-year) window, 
they are less likely to be capturing terms-of-trade fluctuations in their growth events.   
6 Heller (2006) considers wages and interest payments as the 2  non-discretionary expenditures 
in developing countries. In our fiscal data set which is decomposed by “function”‘ rather than 
“economic” use we do not have a wage component for each function so we cannot include wages 
as non-discretionary. See the annex A.1 for the definitions of these components. 
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deficit, def, is -2% of GDP. An increase in DFE  will be declaring as fiscal event 
in t when the following conditions are met over the following five year window:  
 
(i) an increase in DFE average growth of 1 ppa (percentage point per 
annum), 
(ii) If in deficit (i.e def< -2% of GDP), deficit does not increase, 
(iii) If in surplus (or in def  > - 2% of GDP), the increase in DFE does not 
lead to a deficit exceeding 2% of GDP 
 
To illustrate, suppose that, under our definition of window (i.e. regressions over 
5 year periods), there was no increase in DFE over the previous period, and that 
DFE was equal to the sample average of 24%. Then condition (i) above will be 
satisfied for a country if DFE increased by at least 4 percentage points during 
the 5-year period, i.e. it increased to 28% of GDP. The 5-year (rather than a 
longer period) window was dictated by the length of the time-series and our 
desire to have enough fiscal and growth events for statistical analysis. Sensitivity 
of events to the above conditions is discussed in the annex A.3. 
 
This is a first cut at defining a “fiscal event” and this definition could be 
improved upon in several ways.  First, the “event” should not be interpreted as 
entirely discretionary (or unanticipated). The large set of expenditures included 
in DFE implies that the fiscal event captures non-discretionary elements in the 
definition and more restrictive definitions of discretionary fiscal expenditures 
could certainly be built around one of the functional components of fiscal 
expenditures, although any greater volatility in narrower series may be difficult 
to interpret.7 Thus, the most plausible interpretation of the constructed “events” 
is as significant changes in fiscal policy and refrain from attributing any 
government objective to the event. 
 
Second, in view of the links we are seeking to establish between fiscal spending 
events and growth events, one might consider whether the selection of the fiscal 
event (in particular through conditions (ii) and (iii)) is biased towards selecting 
as fiscal events those that are followed by growth.  Actually, due to the 
automatic response of government spending and taxes to output growth, a 
period of growth acceleration after the fiscal event will lead, other things equal, 
to a lower deficit. Hence, by construction, we are more likely to select as fiscal 
events those that are followed by growth since a condition is imposed on the 
evolution of the fiscal deficit (conditions (ii) and (iii)). This is certainly the case 
for OECD countries such as Finland, Sweden or Norway that appear in our 
                                                 
7
 As discussed by Perotti (2007), it is very difficult even in developed countries like the US where 
quarterly data and external information on GDP elasticities of revenues and transfers are both 
available to apply time-series methodologies to detect a fiscal discretionary policy shock (i.e. an 
unanticipated shock) in the data. Data requirements are too demanding to apply these 
(controversial) time-series methodologies to developing countries. 
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event results (see figure 1 below) and that are known for their strong tax 
revenue elasticities to production (elasticities estimated to be greater than 
unity). However, as noted by Perotti (2007), among the papers that have 
studied the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in developing countries (see e.g. 
Kaminsky et al., 2004, and Gavin and Perotti, 1997), it seems widely accepted 
that fiscal policy in these countries is typically pro-cyclical, i.e. the budget deficit 
is positively correlated with economic growth. 8 Hence, according to this pro-
cyclical effect, if a growth event occurs in the year following a fiscal event, this 
should increase the deficit, and hence weaken the probability of observing fiscal 
events followed by a growth event (recall that an increase in discretionary fiscal 
expenditure associated with an increase in the fiscal deficit does not qualify as a 
fiscal event). One might even suspect our definition of fiscal event to 
underestimate, for the developing countries, the correlation with subsequent 
growth. 
 
Third, even though the GFS makes an effort at classifying extra-budget items 
consistently, as already mentioned, data is limited to the Consolidated Central 
Government while a more suitable aggregate would be based on data for the 
Consolidated General Government.9  Given the quality of the data, we have 
refrained from trying to tune the coarse constraint on deficit improvement 
imposed here. A natural extension would be to replace conditions (ii) and (iii) 
by a formal test on sustainability.10 Finally, we would not want to exclude 
countries that sought fiscal space through highly confessional borrowing even if 
this led to an increase in their deficit (since, despite high grant percentage as a 
share of the loan, such loans are not treated as grants).11  This suggests that one 
might wish to take an estimate of the grant component of such loans and 
include that portion in government revenue thereby relaxing the budgetary 
constraint. However, there is no data on the grant component of these loans.  As 
an alternative, we redefined our fiscal event with a fourth condition allowing 
                                                 
8 Several explanations have been advanced to explain the procyclicality of fiscal policy in 
developing countries. Among others, Gavin and Perotti (1997) have argued that developing 
countries face credit constraints that prevent them from borrowing with slow growth. Tornell 
and Lane (1999) show that competition for a common pool of funds among different units 
(ministries, provinces) leads to the so-called “voracity effect” whereby expenditure could 
actually exceed a given windfall. Alesina and Tabellini (2005) show that procyclicality is an 
optimal behavior in the presence voters with imperfect information and corrupt politicians. 
9 86% of the observations rely on data consolidated at the central government sector level and 
the remainder 14% at the budget central government level. See annex A.1.3 for further 
discussion. 
10 Since the sensitivity analysis to the selection of parameter values reported in annex A.3 gives a 
relatively small change in the number of fiscal events over a broad range of parameter values, we 
refrained from experimenting with a formula that would link the value of the deficit level to the 
level of indebtedness, or from more formal tests of sustainability such as those used by Chalk 
and Henning (2001). Moreover these tests have only be done for OECD countries and given the 
lack of availability in indebtedness data, these improvements in the fiscal event definition seem 
hardly worth attempting in our sample.  
11
 We thank Peter Heller for this suggestion. 
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Low-income countries to increase their fiscal deficit during the fiscal spending 
growth period up to 4% of GDP (considering that for low income countries, 
external borrowing is likely to be on highly concessional terms). Results are 
reported in next section.  
 
Fourth, with better indicators of performance of government expenditures than 
GDP per capita growth, this “event-type” analysis could be extended directly to 
the indicators of fiscal expenditure that concern the debate on fiscal space, e.g. 
health and/or education expenditures and expenditures on transport & 
communication (capturing then, for instance, event in budget reallocation 
between government functions for a given amount of total outlays).12 
 
4. Patterns of Fiscal and Growth Events 
 
Keeping in mind the shortcomings of this methodology, we take an exhaustive 
approach by constructing fiscal events for as many countries as possible. Since 
we are interested in the various components of fiscal expenditures, the best 
database is the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS). GFS statistics are 
available for a large number of countries since 1972 and up to 2005.13  Following 
most previous studies on fiscal expenditures we use data on fiscal expenditures 
by function (instead of expenditures by economic classification---i.e. by current 
vs. capital expenditures). As described in annex A.1, after reconciling the fiscal 
data, our sample includes 140 countries, of which 118 are developing (i.e. non 
High Income OECD countries).  
 
Data are described in table 1 which gives decadal averages for the fiscal variables 
used in the study.  A comparison of actual vs. potential observations indicates a 
large number of missing observations, even for OECD countries, especially over 
the period 1991-2000 where the coverage is the weakest. For developing 
countries, coverage gets better through time with data for half of the potential 
observations during the nineties. One of the reasons for the small sample 
(relative to the potential sample) is that we require that data be available for all 
the components of fiscal expenditures by function, else the year observation is 
entered as missing and hence excluded from the sample. This lack of data raises 
the question of biases for the subsequent analysis. In view of the relatively 
evenly spread out pattern of missing observations across the sample, and in the 
absence of any other information, we proceed as if there were no selection 
effects operating via missing data.   
 
                                                 
12 However, as already mention, given the low quality of fiscal data, volatility in narrower series 
may be more difficult to interpret. 
13 There was a major change in the GFS in 1989 causing concern about the comparability of data 
before and after that date (see details on the data reconciliation in annex A.1.2). Using box-plots, 
we explored the possibility of lack of comparability for the series of interest. Fortunately, as 
discussed in the annex A.1.2 (see figure A1), this is not the case.  
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Average deficit figures are comparable across the two groups of countries. 
Regarding our variable of interest—primary fiscal expenditure—the figures are 
about a third higher for OECD industrial countries partly reflecting a larger 
revenue base. As defined here, there is no trend in primary expenditures for the 
two groups of countries over the three decades. As to the components of 
expenditures, developing countries spend proportionately more on general 
public services, on defense and on education, while OECD countries spend more 
on health.  
 
Table 1: Central fiscal expenditures: average values 
      1972-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 
High Income OECD countries (22)    
 Observations (potential number in parenthesis) 159 (198) 179 (220) 129 (220) 
 Overall deficit in GDP % -.90 -2.47 -1.94 
 Total public exp. in GDP % 29.21 35.48 33.77 
 Discretionary public exp. in GDP % a/ 27.79 32.05 30.49 
 Expenditures by function (in % of total public exp.) 100 100 100 
 General public services of which 17.7 22.2 22.9 
  interest payment (4.9) (9.7) (9.7) 
 Defense  8.4 6.8 5.6 
 Transport and Communication 6.8 5.0 3.7 
 Housing and community amenities 2.3 2.1 2.0 
 Health  9.7 10.0 10.8 
 Recreation, culture, and religion 0.9 0.9 1.0 
 Education  9.4 7.9 7.2 
 Others (residual) 40.0 35.5 37.1 
Developing countries (118)    
 Observations (potential number in parenthesis) 360 (1062) 433 (1180) 644 (1180) 
 Overall deficit in GDP % -2.57 -2.38 -1.93 
 Total public exp. in GDP 23.58 26.45 25.44 
 Discretionary public exp. in GDP % a/ 22.40 23.86 22.66 
 Expenditures by function (in % of total public exp.) 100 100 100 
 General public services of which 28.3 27.9 28.0 
 interest payment (5.0) (9.8) (10.9) 
 Defense  12.3 11.3 10.4 
 Transport and Communication 9.6 8.0 5.6 
 Housing and community amenities 2.9 3.1 3.2 
 Health  6.4 6.5 6.9 
 Recreation, culture, and religion 1.5 1.2 1.4 
 Education  14.7 13.7 13.4 
  Others (residual) 19.3 18.4 20.1 
Notes: See annex A.1.3,  table A.3 for country classification in the sample. 
a/ defined as total public expenditures less interest payments. See annexes A.1 and A.2 for 
details on definition and construction of variables. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from GFS data. See Annex A.1. 
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For the growth database, we use the Penn World Table PWT 6.2 as our baseline 
data source.14 Hence, the “growth” database covers 187 countries over the same 
period as the fiscal data base, i.e. 1972-2004. Taking into account missing data, 
the sample includes 5380 observations hence 87% of the potential number of 
observations (=6171=187 countries*33 years). 
 
Turn now to the construction of growth and fiscal events as defined in section 3 
and in the annex A.3. Due to the availability of GFS data since 1972, we have a 
shorter time-series than HPR. This implies that we cannot use periods as long 
as HPR who used GDP data going back to 1950, leading them to choose 8-year 
periods, i.e. 7n = and giving them events over the period 1958-1992 (GDP data 
available until 1999). As mentioned above, due to the limitations imposed by the 
availability of fiscal data, we choose 5-year periods for both fiscal and growth 
events, i.e. 4n = . This means that the exercise covers the period 1977-2000. 15  
Because there is missing data, we have also imposed that data be available for 4 
out of the 5 years entering each “window”. If this condition is not satisfied, a 
missing value is entered for that “window”. 
 
Having computed the fiscal and growth events on their respective databases, we 
merge the two into a final dataset (see annex A.2 for details). The resulting 
database includes 107 countries (84 developing countries, i.e. all non- High 
Income OECD countries), over 1977-2000.  This leads to 1452 observations 
hence 57% of the potential number (=2568=107 countries*24 years). 
 
As indicated in the annex A.3--where we carry out sensitivity analysis with 
respect to the selection of parameter values in defining events--for this sample 
and for the parameter values selected here, we get 58 growth events and 95 
fiscal events (see table A.4 for the number of events obtained when we change 
parameter values over the sample). This is our benchmark data set over which 
exploration takes place. As discussed in table A.4, the number of events is 
relatively insensitive to a range of plausible parameter values. Nor are changes 
in the pattern of events surprising when we change parameter values.  
 
Figure 1 plots a subset of events in this benchmark case: 25 fiscal events are 
simultaneous or followed by a growth event, 23 fiscal events are preceded by a 
growth event. The residual (47) events that are neither followed nor preceded by 
a growth event are not shown in the figure (also see the details in table A.4).   
                                                 
14 Using WDI database is an alternative. However, as shown by HPR, this does not affect the 
results. 
15 When we define n=8 instead of 5, the period under study shrinks to 1980-1997 and we get 52 
fiscal events and 18 growth events. 
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Figure 1. Growth events vs. fiscal events 
 
Notes: 
- 19 points strictly above the red line (growth event strictly preceded by fiscal event); 
- 23 points strictly below the red line (growth event strictly followed by fiscal event); 
- 6 points on the red line (growth event simultaneous to fiscal event, of which 4 in Latin 
America). 
95-48=47 fiscal events with no associated growth events not shown in the figure. 
  
ARG: Argentina; BTN: Bhutan; CHL: Chile; CMR: Cameroon; CRI: Costa Rica; DOM: 
Dominican Republic; FIN: Finland; GBR: United Kingdom; HUN: Hungary; IRL: Ireland; ISL: 
Iceland; ISR: Israel; KOR: Korea, Rep.; LSO: Lesotho; MEX: Mexico; MLT: Malta; MYS: 
Malaysia; NOR: Norway; PAN: Panama; PNG: Papua New Guinea; SGP: Singapore; SWE: 
Sweden; URY: Uruguay. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from GFS and PWT 6.2 data. 
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Table 2 reports unconditional probabilities of these fiscal events.16 For the 
whole sample and given our construction of a fiscal event, the probability of 
occurrence of a fiscal event is 9.7% and the probability of a growth event once a 
fiscal event has occurred is 26.3%. Table 2 also reports probabilities across 
countries ranked according to their income per capita and by region). Column 5 
shows that, although the probability of occurrence of a fiscal event is fairly 
evenly spread across the income quartiles, the probability is higher for the lower 
quartiles (first and second). It is difficult to interpret this pattern since, as 
explained above, this definition of a fiscal event does not distinguish between 
fiscal policy shocks and systematic fiscal policy. If one can assume that fiscal 
policy shocks are not more prevalent among low and middle income countries, 
then the pattern would seem to indicate that fiscal policy is more volatile among 
low-income countries. The probability that a fiscal event is followed by a growth 
event is much higher for the third quartile (i.e. for middle-income countries 
which are largely in Latin America). Note however, that the patterns suggest 
that fiscal policy may be pro-cyclical (but not destabilizing given our definition 
of fiscal event) in Latin America since, out of the 9 fiscal events associated with 
growth in Latin America, 4 are simultaneous (see figure 1), which seems to 
confirm earlier results (see e.g. Gavin and Perotti, 1997, Kaminsky et al. 2004 
and Perotti, 2007). 
 
The bottom part of table 2 shows that developing (i.e. non High Income OECD) 
countries almost have twice as high a probability of a fiscal event occurrence 
than industrial countries. At the same time, developing countries are less likely 
to have a growth event following a fiscal event. Within the developing country 
group, as already noted, Latin America stands out with both the lowest 
probability of occurrence of a fiscal event, and the highest probability that the 
event is followed by a growth event.  
 
It is instructive to compare, side by side, probabilities of a fiscal event with the 
probability of a fiscal event followed by a growth event. This is done in figure 2. 
Consider first figure 2a. It is clear that low-income countries have both a higher 
probability of having a fiscal event, but a lower probability of having a fiscal 
event followed by a growth event. Looking at it by region in figure 2b, one sees 
                                                 
16 These probabilities are computed by dividing the numbers of events by the number of 
country-year observations in which an event could have occurred. The latter is calculated by 
summing all the observations in the sample and eliminating: (i) a 4-year window after the 
occurrence of each event since our qualifying conditions take this period as belonging to the 
same episode; (ii) the potential competing dates before the event that have been eliminated by 
the spline regression. This rule gives 977 possible occasions in which a fiscal event could have 
occurred, i.e. the probability of a fiscal event is: 95/977=9.7% (see table 2 col. 5) for a typical 
country over the full-sample period 1977-2000. Likewise, a typical country would have about 
2.6% (col. 6)  probability of experimenting a fiscal event followed by a growth acceleration at 
some point over 1977-2000. This means that the probability of growth acceleration when a fiscal 
event has occurred is around 26.3% (table 2, col. 8). 
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that this pattern is largely reflecting the distribution of fiscal and growth events 
in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Suppose then that the success of a 
fiscal event can indeed be measured by whether or not it is followed by a growth 
event. One is then tempted to add that these patterns could reflect the quality of 
underlying institutions. Indeed, according to many indicators, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East have bad scores on several indicators of institutional 
quality. 
 
Note that when we use the alternative definition of fiscal event allowing Low-
income countries to increase their average fiscal deficit during the fiscal 
spending growth period up to 4% of GDP, 3 additional fiscal events followed by 
a growth event are identified: Mali, Mauritius and Burkina Faso. Then, under 
this scenario, the probability that a fiscal event is followed by a growth event in 
Middle East and Africa increases from 11% to 21%. 
 
 
Table 2. Fiscal event probabilities    a/ 
 
 Number of fiscal events: Probability of occurrence : 
 
Total 
fiscal 
events 
 
followed  
by a 
 growth 
event 
NOT 
followed  
by a 
 growth 
event 
obs. 
b/  
Total 
fiscal 
events  
Fiscal 
events 
followed by 
a growth 
event 
Fiscal 
events NOT 
followed by 
a growth 
event 
Probability 
that a fiscal 
event is 
followed by 
a growth 
event 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=1/4 (6)=2/4 (7)=3/4 (8)=6/5 
Total 95 25 70 977 9.7% 2.6% 7.2% 26.3% 
First GDP pc Quartile c/ 26 4 22 233 11.2% 1.7% 9.4% 15.4% 
Second GDP pc Quartile 27 8 19 228 11.8% 3.5% 8.3% 29.6% 
Third GDP pc Quartile 19 9 10 268 7.1% 3.4% 3.7% 47.4% 
Fourth GDP pc Quartile 23 4 19 248 9.3% 1.6% 7.7% 17.4% 
High Income OECD 
countries 21 6 15 297 7.6% 2.2% 5.4% 28.6% 
Developing countries 74 19 55 680 12.2% 3.1% 9.1% 25.7% 
Asia 17 5 12 171 11.0% 3.3% 7.8% 29.4% 
Middle East & Africa  28 3 25 198 14.1% 1.5% 12.6% 10.7% 
Latin America & Carib. 20 9 11 235 8.5% 3.8% 4.7% 45.0% 
Europe & Central Asia 9 2 7 76 11.8% 2.6% 9.2% 22.2% 
Notes: See annex A.1.3,  table A.3 for country classification in the sample. 
a/    Computations based on benchmark set of parameters from table A.4, row 1 (58 growth events and 95  
fiscal events). 
b/   Obs. in which a fiscal event could have occurred. 
c/   “First GDP pc Quartile” corresponds to “low income” and some “lower middle income” countries. 
“Second GDP pc Quartile”: “lower middle income" and some "upper middle income” countries. 
“Third GDG pc Quartile”: “high income” countries. 
“Fourth GDP pc Quartile”: “upper middle income” countries. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from GFS and PWT 6.2 data, see Annex A.2 
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Figure 2. Fiscal and Growth event probabilities by income quartiles and  regions 
 
a. by GDP per capita Quartiles (“Fourth” is the highest) 
 
%: probability of growth acceleration when a fiscal event has occurred 
b. by regions  
 
%: probability of growth acceleration when a fiscal event has occurred  
 
Source: computation from Table 2, cols 5 and 8. 
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5. Understanding Fiscal Events:  
 
The Anatomy of fiscal Events. The benchmark set of parameters selected 95 
fiscal events. Table 3 describes the changes in the composition of fiscal 
expenditures around these events. The table shows average values and changes 
for the 5-year period preceding the event and the 5-year following the event. 
Table 4 gives the same information, but this time the comparison is between 
events that preceded a growth event and events that did not precede a growth 
event, focusing on “Low and Middle Income” countries. 
 
Start with the anatomy of fiscal events in table 3. Not surprisingly, the 
restriction that fiscal events in deficit situations should be accompanied by a 
reduction in the fiscal deficit is reflected in the evolution of the fiscal deficit 
(reduction) between the periods preceding and following the event date. The 
patterns are the same for both groups of countries (i.e. High and non-High 
income countries), average changes (see last column) being larger for the Low 
and Middle Income country group. Likewise, individual changes in expenditures 
by functional group are larger for Low and Middle Income than for High Income 
countries. However, the pattern of changes for the big expenditure categories is 
the same for both groups of countries.  
 
One can check if there are noticeable differences in the changes in expenditures 
across the two groups. Taking the whole sample and ignoring the residual 
category, fiscal events involve a shift towards Education, Health and Housing & 
Community expenditures at the expense of Defense, non-interest General Public 
Services, and Transport & Communication expenditures. For the Low and 
Middle Income country group, the three big expenditure items are (percentage 
of discretionary expenditures in parenthesis): non-interest Public Services 
(20.2%), Education (13.8%) and Defense (10.4%). Compared with the High 
Income events, the Low and Middle Income country events indicate a much 
bigger cut in non-interest public services and in defense expenditures, the latter 
probably capturing countries entering a post-conflict situation.  
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Table 3: Characteristics of fiscal events 
 
  fiscal events (95) a/ 
     Average level by 5-year period 
     (average annual growth in Italics) 
     Pre-event period Post-event period 
change ppa 
    [t-n-1; t-1] [t;t+n]   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(3)-(1) 
% of public expenditure in GDP    All 25.51 -1.33 24.43 0.73 -1.08 
  HIc/ 29.41 -0.85 28.76 0.82 -0.65 
  non HI c/ 23.53 -1.58 22.22 0.69 -1.31 
% of public deficit/surplus  in GDP   All -2.92 0.79 -0.73 -0.32 2.19 
  HIc/ -1.94 0.69 -0.25 -0.50 1.69 
  non HI c/ -3.44 0.84 -0.97 -0.23 2.46 
Expenditures by function    Change % 
(in % of total public exp.)          (5)=(3-1)/1 
Education All 12.54 0.16 13.50 0.15 7.7% 
  HI 9.95 -0.06 10.17 0.03 2.1% 
  non HI  13.80 0.28 15.13 0.21 9.7% 
Health All 7.13 0.07 7.50 0.07 5.1% 
  HI 8.70 0.01 8.92 -0.03 2.5% 
  non HI  6.36 0.10 6.80 0.13 6.9% 
Transport & Communication All 6.17 -0.13 5.46 0.01 -11.6% 
  HI 4.83 -0.18 4.32 0.01 -10.8% 
  non HI  6.80 -0.11 5.99 0.01 -11.9% 
Non-interest public services All 18.04 -0.94 16.78 -0.40 -7.0% 
  HI 13.77 -0.25 13.64 0.09 -1.0% 
  non HI  20.18 -1.30 18.35 -0.65 -9.1% 
Defense All 9.97 -0.18 8.82 -0.06 -11.6% 
  HI 9.18 -0.10 8.42 -0.15 -8.3% 
  non HI  10.37 -0.23 9.01 -0.01 -13.1% 
Housing &  community amenities All 3.09 0.09 3.57 0.12 15.5% 
  HI 3.03 -0.02 2.86 0.18 -5.7% 
  non HI  3.12 0.15 3.92 0.09 25.9% 
Recreation, culture,& religion All 1.41 0.01 1.23 0.01 -12.8% 
  HI 0.97 0.00 0.98 -0.01 0.9% 
  non HI  1.62 0.01 1.35 0.02 -17.0% 
Others (residual) All 41.64 - 43.15 - 3.6% 
  HI 49.55 - 50.70 - 2.3% 
  non HI  37.75 - 39.44 - 4.5% 
 
Notes: See annex A.1.3, table A.3 for country classification in the sample. 
Col. 1: average over 5-year period preceding fiscal event;  Col. 3: average over 5-year period after fiscal event 
a/ Based on the benchmark set of parameters (table A.4, row 1).  
b/ Average annual growth rate over the period in parenthesis 
c/ HI stands for “High-Income” countries as defined by World Bank (July 2007);  
   “HI” sample = 32 fiscal events, “non HI” sample = 63 events. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from GFS and PWT 6.2 data, see Annex A.2. 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2007.25 
 
 20 
Focusing on the Low and Middle Income country group, table 4 compares the 
evolution of functional expenditures for fiscal events followed by a growth event 
compared with those not followed by growth events. In particular, we look at the 
underlying changes of discretionary public expenditures by function. 
  
 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of Fiscal Events in Developing countries 
According to Their Timing with Growth Events a/ 
 
    
fiscal event followed by a 
growth event 
fiscal event NOT followed by 
a growth event 
      14/63 49/63 
     Average level Average level 
     Pre-event Post-event 
change 
ppa 
Pre-event Post-event 
change 
ppa 
 (1) (2) (3) 
=(2)-(1) 
(4) (5) (6) 
=(5)-(4) 
% of public expenditure in GDP 25.4* 24.0* -1.4 23.0* 21.7* -1.3 
% of public deficit in GDP -3.4 -0.3* 3.2* -3.4 -1.2* 2.3* 
Expenditures by function  
(in % of total public exp.)    
change 
% 
=(2-1)/(1)    
change 
% 
=(5-4)/(4) 
Education  12.8 14.4 13% 14.1 15.3 9% 
Health  8.4* 8.8* 5% 5.7* 6.2* 8% 
Transport and Communication 6.4 6.6* 3%* 6.3 5.8* -7%* 
General (non interest) public services 16.5* 15.4* -7%* 21.3* 19.3* -10%* 
Defense  6.0* 5.5* -8%* 11.7* 10.0* -14%* 
Housing and community amenities 4.5* 4.2 -7%* 2.7* 3.9 43%* 
Recreation, culture, and religion 1.5 1.0 -30% 1.7 1.4 -13% 
Others (residual) 43.9 44.1 0% 36.5 38.0 4% 
Notes 
Developing countries are defined as low and middle income countries, see Annex A.1.3. 
* Test of difference in mean between fiscal event NOT followed by a growth event compared to fiscal 
event followed by a growth event (i.e. col. 4, 5, 6 compared to col. 1, 2 and 3 respectively). An asterisk 
indicates significance at 5% level. 
a/ Based on the benchmark set of parameters, see table A.4, row 2. 
 
   Source: Authors’ computation from GFS and PWT 6.2 data, see Annex A.2. 
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First note that the level of the deficit in GDP is lower during fiscal events 
followed by a growth event, a result that is corroborated by the regression 
analysis in section 5.17 
 
Three other significant differences appear when one compares the evolution of 
fiscal expenditure for the two groups of events. First, fiscal events followed by 
growth events devote fewer resources to general public services. Second, fiscal 
events followed by a growth event are characterized by a growing share of 
transport and communication expenditure whereas the pattern is the opposite 
when the fiscal event is not followed by a growth event. Third, though the 
difference in means is not statistically significant, there is a higher growth in 
education expenditures when the fiscal event is followed by a growth event than 
when it is not (and the opposite pattern holds for health expenditures). 
 
 
Correlates of Growth Events.  We now look for any evidence that growth 
events may be correlated with fiscal events using regression analysis. Our 
dependent variable is then a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the 3-year 
window around the date of growth acceleration (and 0 otherwise), the 3-year 
window (as in HPR) reflecting the uncertainty attached to the identification of 
the first year of a specific growth event.18 The comparison group for a growth 
event consists of the countries that have not had a growth episode in that same 3 
years. We estimate the following probit19  where the binary dependant variable 
                                                 
17 As discussed in section 3, insofar as the growth event occurs during the 5-year period when 
the fiscal deficit is computed, there could be a mechanical effect whereby the fiscal deficit will be 
lower during spells of high growth. On the other hand, the evidence for developing countries 
discussed in section 3 shows that fiscal expenditures and fiscal deficits are higher during periods 
of high growth (more capital inflows and “voracity” effects in the political cycle).  
18 Growth events are computed according to the same benchmark with 58 growth events. 
Because we are interested in predicting the timing of growth events, we drop all data 
corresponding to years t+2...t+4 of a growth event. The sample then consists of all countries for 
which the relevant data are available, including countries that have not experienced growth 
episodes. Given the lack of availability for terms of trade data, we use sample of 104 countries 
(71 “non high income” countries), over 1977-2000, and 1127 observations (706 for the “non high 
income” sample). Note that there are still 50 growth events (29 for “non high income” countries) 
and 73 fiscal events (54 for “non high income” countries) in this sample, with 22 cases of fiscal 
events followed by a growth event (14 for “non high income” countries). See Annex A.2. 
19 We also fit a logit. Both probit and logit fit maximum likelihood models with dichotomous 
dependent variables coded as 0/1. With a logit model, equation (1) would be identical except for 
φ  which is the cumulative logistic distribution rather than the cumulative normal distribution. 
It is difficult to theoretically justify the choice between these two models. Note that the logistic 
distribution being very similar to the normal one, results are usually identical. However, some 
differences in results could appear in very unbalanced sample, i.e. in a sample in which there are 
many more 0s than 1s, which is our case. This is why, as a robustness check, we also present 
logit estimation results. 
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(the 3-year window around the date of the year of the growth event, GEit) is 
regressed on several determinants: 
 
( ) 0 1 2 3 4
1
Pr 1it it it it it t t
t
GE FE WW TOT HI D for i=1..104; t=1..24φ α α α α α β
−
 
= = + + + + + 
 
∑   (1) 
where: 
  
φ   is the cumulative normal distribution; 
FEit  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 at the date of the fiscal event 
as defined in the benchmark above and during the four years following this 
date; 
WWit is a proxy for trade (and other) reforms, i.e. a dummy taking the value of 1 
during the first five years of a transition towards openness as defined by 
WW (2003); 
TOTit is a proxy for any external shock, i.e. a dummy taking the value of 1 if the 
change in the terms of trade for country i and year t is in the upper 90% of 
the entire sample. Following HPR, this variable is introduced to capture 
exceptionally favorable external circumstances;20 
HIit is a dummy equals to one for High Income countries; 
∑
−1t
tD is a full set of year effects. 
 
In equation (1), the year dummies capture the effects of omitted time-related 
variables like common shocks across countries that could account for a growth 
event. As to the fiscal dummy event variable, FEit, it is a way to test whether, on 
average, growth events are preceded by fiscal events. The inclusion of the WWit 
dummy for trade reform is both to capture the potential growth effects of a trade 
reform, but also the effects of other ongoing reforms since, very often, trade 
reforms are part of a broader package of reforms. Finally, as pointed out by 
Easterly et al. (1993), it is also plausible that many growth acceleration are 
triggered by favorable external conditions, especially in our context where, due 
to the short length of time series, we defined growth events over a 5-year 
window.21 To control for this, we introduce the TOTit dummy. 
 
                                                 
20 The change in the terms of trade is computed as the first difference of the log of the terms-of-
trade index , the latter defined as the ratio of export prices to import prices using the current 
and constant price values of exports and imports from WDI. We use this index instead of the 
more traditional net-barter index because of its broader coverage. However, this measure has 
the disadvantage that it includes the service export sector (see the discussion in Loayza and 
Raddatz, 2007).  
21 Easterly et al. (1993) showed that about 10 percent of the variation in GDP growth and a 
quarter of the variation in growth volatility can be explained by the observed differences in the 
volatility of terms-of-trade changes. 
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Table 5: Probit Estimates of Growth events 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy for the timing of growth events  
  Probit Probit Probit Probit Logit Logit 
Col.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
FEit (fiscal event dummy) 0.038** 0.045** 0.054*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.058** 
 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.018 
FEit * 
,FE FEt t n
def +  - - 0.019*** 0.019** 0.017*** 0.018** 
   0.007 0.009 0.006 0.009 
WWit (Trade liberal. dummy) -0.061** -0.069** -0.055* -0.060** -0.049** -0.049** 
 0.024 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.025 0.023 
TOTit (Terms of trade dummy) 0.129* 0.132** 0.122* 0.121** 0.119 0.113* 
 0.086 0.080 0.084 0.078 0.085 0.069 
DCt (developed-country dummy) 0.005 - 0.007 - 0.006 - 
 0.020   0.020   0.018   
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sample All non HI All non HI All non HI 
Obs. 1127 706 1127 706 1127 706 
Pseudo R² 0.08 0.10 0.9 0.11 0.09 0.11 
observed proportion 
 of GEit=1 12.5% 11.6% 12.5% 11.6% 12.5% 11.6% 
Estimation by probit. Coefficients are marginal probabilities evaluated at the sample means. 
Numbers below coefficients are robust standard errors. See text for definition of variables. 
HI stands for “High Income” countries as defined by the World Bank, July 2007. 
***, **, * indicates significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
We allow for a five-year lag between a change in the underlying determinant and a growth event. The timing of the 
growth event is the three year window centered on the initiation dates. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation, see Annex A.2. 
 
 
Before commenting on the results, one should caution about the endogeneity 
problems, especially of the fiscal event dummy. It could be that in country-
events when growth is anticipated to be unusually high, one might think that 
policy-makers would increase discretionary public spending (simultaneous bias 
if this increase occurs with a decreasing associated deficit). Unfortunately, we 
lack appropriate instruments, so the results should be interpreted accordingly. 
 
Cols. (1) and (2) in table 5 report the marginal coefficients corresponding to the 
estimation of (1) on the whole and on the “non high income” samples 
respectively. Hence, the reported coefficients give directly the change in the 
probability that a growth event occurs for a discrete change of the 
corresponding dummy variable from 0 to 1.  
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Col. (1) which reports estimates for all countries, shows that the coefficient 
associated with FEit is significantly positive (at the 5% level) implying that, on 
average, a fiscal event increases the probability of experiencing a growth event 
in the five consecutive years by 3.8 percentage points. 22 
 
Turning to the variable that captures the five years following economic reform 
(other than fiscal) through trade liberalization, WWit, surprisingly, the 
coefficient is significantly negative. This coefficient was also negative but not 
significantly in HPR. However, this surprisingly negative coefficient does not 
necessarily contradict WW (2003) results since when they study the timing of 
the growth response to trade liberalization they find that, in the 3 pre-
liberalization years, growth is slightly depressed and that, in the 3 years 
following liberalization, the effect is not significantly different from zero. 
However, an increase in growth becomes noticeable (of around 1.5 percentage 
point) after 4 years.23  
 
As expected, we observe a strong conditional correlation between external 
shocks and the probability of a growth event: a large positive terms-of-trade 
shocks increases the probability of experiencing a growth event by 12.9 
percentage points (significant at a 10% level). This confirms that the incidence 
of external shocks and, in particular, fluctuations in the terms of trade plays an 
important role. Finally, the high income dummy is not significantly different 
from zero so that when we limit our sample to “non high income” countries (see 
col. 2), coefficients remains very similar. 
 
Recent literature assessing the effects of public expenditures on growth (e.g. 
Kneller et al., 2000, Bose et al., 2003, and Adam and Bevan, 2005) has 
emphasized the importance of incorporating the budget constraint. Here we 
check whether the impact of a fiscal event on the probability of a growth event is 
directly correlated with the level of the associated deficit by introducing the 
fiscal event dummy FEit interactively with its associated deficit/surplus level 
,FE FEt t n
def + ( FEt being the date of the fiscal event, n=4).24  
 
                                                 
22
 As argued in section 3, in “non-high” income countries, evidence suggests that fiscal policy 
typically pro-cyclical. Hence, if a growth event occurs in the year following a fiscal event, this 
should increase the deficit, weakening the probability of observing fiscal events followed by a 
growth event. 
23 Remember that one of the conditions for a growth event in this paper is an increase in the 
annual growth rate of per capita GDP of at least 2 pp. Hence, if we redefine the dummy WWit in 
order to capture the years [t+5 and more] after the trade liberalization instead of [t; t+4] as 
previously, we obtain a positive coefficient, though its value is not statistically significant. 
24
 Of course, the fiscal deficit/surplus situation is implicitly already taken into account as one of 
the conditions defining what we call a “Fiscal event” is that a deficit situation must improve. 
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Results reported in col. (3) and (4) show that the associated coefficient is 
significantly positive (at 1% level) indicating that the marginal impact of a fiscal 
event depends on both coefficients (associated to FEit and  FEit * 
,FE FEt t n
def + ). 
This means that the probability of occurrence of a growth event in the 5 years 
following a fiscal event is greater the lower the associated fiscal deficit, 
confirming the prima facie appropriateness of fiscal policy as a stabilizing 
device. It would however, be premature to read into these results that there may 
not be a trade-off between the stabilization and growth objectives of fiscal 
policy, since omitted variables correlated with the regressors are likely to 
influence these results. Coefficient values associated with WWit and TOTit 
remain unchanged. 
 
To ease interpretation, table 6 reports for a typical Low and Middle Income 
country, the impact of a fiscal event on the occurrence of a growth event for 
different values of the associated deficit/surplus. As indicated in the table, for a 
typical Low or Middle Income country and in the absence of a fiscal event in the 
five preceding years, the probability of a growth event is around 7.8%.25 This 
probability is quite similar in case of a fiscal event with an associated fiscal 
deficit equals to 3% of GDP (only 0.06 percentage point of difference).26  The 
probability of a growth event increases to 9.6% in case of a fiscal event in a 
deficit situation of 2% of GDP, and reaches 16.9% in a surplus situation of 1%, 
implying an increase in growth event probability of 9.1 percentage point 
compared to the no-fiscal-event alternative.  Remember that to be qualifying as 
fiscal event this deficit can not increase with public expenditure. 
                                                 
25 Based on results in table 5, col.(4) with 0itFE = , all other variables set at their sample mean. 
26 Based on results in table 5, col.(4) with 1itFE = ,  all other variables set at their sample mean.   
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Table 6: Interpretation of Probit Model Results a/ 
 
 
Fiscal Event 
 associated with an average deficit of: 
 
No  
Fiscal Event 
 -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 
Probability of occurrence of a growth 
event in the 5 following years  b/ 
7.8% 7.8% 9.6% 11.8% 14.2% 16.9% 
Change in growth event probability 
from a no fiscal event situation  
0.06 pp 1.9 pp 4.0 pp 6.4 pp 9.1 pp 
 
Note: pp stands for percentage points. 
a/ Evaluation based on  coefficients of the equation reported in column 4, table 5.  
b/ Evaluation of  0 1 1 , 2 3
1
*
FE FE
tit itit it t t n t
t
FE FE def WW DC Dφ α α α α α β
+
−
+ + + + +
 
 
 
∑  
for  different values of itFE and ,FE FEt t ndef + , all other variables evaluated at their sample mean, 
φ  representing the standard cumulative normal distribution. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from table 5, col.4. 
 
 
Finally, table 7 reports statistics of the predictive ability of this Probit model. It 
is customary to take a prediction rule with a threshold value is p* = 0.5, on the 
basis that we would predict a 1 if the model says a 1 is more likely than a zero : 
 
  1itGE =  if the predicted probabilityφˆ> p* 
 
However, because of the unbalanced sample with many more 0s than 1s, we set 
p* equal to the proportion of 1’s in the sample (which corresponds to the 
average predicted probability in the sample).  
 
Taking this criterion, table 7 suggests that the basic model as defined in table 5, 
column (4), successfully predicts 78% of the growth events (i.e. GEit=1) and 
62.3% of total cases of no growth events (i.e. GEit=0). Hence, 64.2% of total 
growth event observations are correctly predicted.  Since this measure of 
goodness of fit depends on the cutoff selected to classify the predicted  itGE , one 
should only interpret the results in table 7 as indicative orders of magnitude.  
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Table 7: Prediction Accuracy of the Probit Model a/ 
 
Share of actual GEit predicted by the model  
(share in total observation in parenthesis) 
 
  actual 
 GE=1 GE=0 
GE=1 78.0% (9.1%) 37.7% (33.3%) 
GE=0 22.0% (2.5%) 62.3% (55.1%) 
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 
Total 100.0% (11.6%) 100.0% (88.4%) 
 
Correctly classified = 64.2% 
 
 
a/ computation based on coefficients reported in column 4 in table 5 , cutoff =11.6% (value for 
determining whether an observation has a predicted positive outcome). 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from table 5, col.4. 
 
We carry out two robustness checks. First, as discussed above, we estimate a 
logit function (which has fatter tails and may be more appropriate for our 
sample with many zero values for the dependent variable). Results in columns 
(5) and (6) of table 5 show that the logit specification does not change the 
qualitative conclusions based on results in col. (3) and (4). Second, we change 
the definition of FEit with the dummy that takes the value of 1 at the date of the 
fiscal event and during the 9 years following this date (instead of 4). This 
alternative, which gives more time for the effects of a fiscal event to have an 
impact on growth, does not alter qualitatively the estimates. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper constructs growth and primary spending expenditures (i.e.net of 
interest payments) “events” over the period 1972-2005 for 118 developing and 
22 High Income OECD countries. Fiscal expenditures were compiled by 
Government function, and “events” were sought over 5-year rolling windows 
with a missing observation attributed if less than 4 out of 5 years of data were 
available. For the growth episodes, data was available for 87% of the potential of 
6171 observations. For the fiscal episodes, data was available for 40% of the 
potential 4760 observations. In spite of more than half of the potential 
observations missing for the construction of fiscal events, in the end, the search 
for events was based on a sufficiently large data base allowing for statistical 
tests. 
 
Significant “events” were approximately constructed as follows (see section 3 
and annex A.3 for details). For GDP per capita, acceleration in the average 
annual growth rate of 2 percentage point per annum (ppa) between any rolling 
5-year window would qualify for a growth “event”. For fiscal expenditures 
(expressed in GDP%), an increase in the average growth rate of approximately 1 
ppa that would not be accompanied by an aggravation of the (consolidated 
central government) fiscal deficit beyond 2% of GDP would likewise qualify for a 
fiscal “event”. The resulting benchmark constructed data set (merging both 
fiscal and growth databases) had 58 growth events and 95 fiscal events over a 
sample included 107 countries (84 developing countries) over 1977-2000 (1452 
observations). 
 
For this sample, the (unconditional) probability of occurrence of a fiscal event is 
about 10%, and, for a large range of parameter values for the selection of a 
“significant” event, the probability of a growth event once a fiscal event had 
occurred is in the 22%- 28% range. The probability of occurrence of a fiscal 
event is higher for the bottom half of the income distribution of countries, but 
the probability that this fiscal event is followed by a growth event is higher for 
the third quartiles, corresponding to middle income countries (which are largely 
in Latin America). Finally, the probability of a fiscal event not followed by a 
growth event is significantly higher for the Middle East and Africa region, 
prompting us to note that this result is coherent with the view (taken by the 
interim report presented to the Development Committee, 2006) that the success 
of a growth-oriented fiscal expenditure package hinges on the quality of the 
institutional environment. 
 
For both “High income” and “Low and Middle Income” countries, fiscal events 
involve a shift towards education, health and Housing & Community 
expenditures at the expense of defense, non-interest Public Services, and 
Transport & Communication expenditures, the shifts always being larger for 
developing countries, confirming more volatility (and probably a lesser 
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stabilization role of fiscal policy since the data cover a medium-term horizon). 
In particular, the Low and Middle Income country events indicate a much 
bigger cut in non-interest public services and in defense expenditures, the latter 
probably capturing countries entering a post-conflict situation.  
 
Concentrating on the Low and Middle Income sample of 84 countries, the paper 
also investigates the differences in the pattern of functional expenditures for 
fiscal events followed by growth events compared to those not followed by a 
growth event. In addition to a significantly lower fiscal deficit for fiscal events 
followed by a growth event (which is partly an outcome of the way events were 
constructed), three other significant differences appear. First, fiscal events 
followed by growth events devote fewer resources to general public services. 
Second, fiscal events followed by a growth event are characterized by a growing 
share of transport and communication expenditure whereas the pattern is the 
opposite when the fiscal event is not followed by a growth event. Third, though 
the difference in means is not statistically significant, there is a higher growth in 
education expenditures when the fiscal event is followed by a growth event than 
when it is not. 
 
This description of the anatomy of fiscal events and their relation to growth 
events is completed by statistical analysis where a few controlling factors are 
included in a probit estimate of growth events on fiscal events. On average, we 
find that a growth event is more likely to occur when surrounded by a fiscal 
event. Second, controlling for the growth-related effects of other reforms 
(captured by the Wacziarg-Welch indicator) and for favorable external 
conditions shocks (better terms-of-trade), we estimate that for a typical 
developing country, the probability of occurrence of a growth event in the five 
years following a fiscal event is increased as the associated fiscal deficit is 
limited.  
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ANNEXES 
 
Annex A.1 explains the construction of the “fiscal” database from which fiscal events 
are computed.  Annex A.2 presents the database used to compute the growth events 
and the final database that results from the merge of the “fiscal” and “growth” 
databases. 
 
A.1. Fiscal Database 
A 1.1. Definition of Variables and Conversion of 1986 GFS data into the 2001 GFS format. 
A.1.2. Data Consistency Check for the Change in GFS series. 
A.1.3. Sector and Data Availability in the Fiscal Database. 
A.2 Consolidated Database  
A.3. Fiscal and Growth Events: Definitions and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A.1. FISCAL DATABASE 
 
To define the fiscal event, we use the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) 
database. GFS is the main data source for most empirical cross-country studies on 
government expenditures. The reason for its popularity is that it is the only database 
offering comparable data on public expenditure for a large sample of countries in the 
world including many developing countries. As noted by Estache et al. (2006), “this 
does not mean that the data are good” (see Estache et al. 2006 pages 6-7 for a survey 
on the main problems with these data). Keeping these limitations in mind, we are 
able to compute the notion of a fiscal event as defined in body of the paper.  
 
Annex A.1.1 reports in details the definition of the fiscal variables used in the study 
with notably the classification of expense by function of Government according to the 
GFS manual 2001. Because there was a major change in the data series between 1989 
and 1990 when the definition of variables in the GFS changed, we also explain in 
detail in annex A.1.1 the conversion of 1986 GFS data (i.e. the GFS system that covers 
data from 1972 to 1989) into the 2001 GFS format (i.e. GFS system that covers data 
from 1990 to 2004) for our budgetary variables, i.e., Total Revenue, Total expense (or 
outlays), and the decomposition of outlays by functions.  
 
Because there was this major change in the data series between 1989 and 1990, we 
also checked if there was a break in the converted series of interest for this study. The 
box plots are reported in Annex A.1.2. To our relief, figure A1 does not indicate a 
break in the series around 1989-1990 justifying our keeping this year in the sample. 
 
Finally, the countries/years with available data on total revenue, total expenditure, 
and disaggregated expenditure by function are reported in Annex A.1.3, table A3. 
We use data at the consolidated central government sector level and at the budgetary 
central government level if the former is not available. Then the “fiscal” database 
used in the study includes the 140 countries (including 22 High income OECD 
countries) listed in table A1 and extends over 1972-2005. This amounts up to 1904 
observations for each variable. 
 
Note that Tables 1, A2, A3 and Figures A1 reported in this study are computed on this 
“fiscal” database.  
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 A.1.1. Definition of Variables and Conversion of 1986 GFS data into the 
2001 GFS format. 
 
GFS 1986 data are by definition on a cash basis. Hence, we complete data with GFS 
2001 data in the "Statement of sources and Uses of Cash" (and not in the "statement 
of Government Operations", recorded on an accrual basis). Box A.1(a) gives a 
description of the Statement of sources and Uses of Cash as defined in the GFS 
manual (GFSM) 2001. 
 
BOX A.1: Classification of GFSM 2001. 
 
(a) Statement of sources and uses of cash: (b) The classification Coding system for GFS: 
 
 
1) Classification of the Function of Government. 
2) By sector of the counterparty to the financial 
instrument. 
Source: GFSM 2001.  
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Table A.1 report the conversion of 1986 GFS data into the 2001 GFS format for our 
budgetary variables, i.e., Total Revenue, Total expense (or outlays), and the 
decomposition of outlays by functions. The classification of functions of Government 
(COFOG) is a detailed classification of the functions, or socioeconomic objectives, 
that general government units aim to achieve through various kinds of outlays. This 
classification has been published by the United Nations and has been revised. The 
GFSM 2001 incorporates the revised COFOG (reported in Box A.2) and table A.1 
takes also into account the correspondence between different COFOG versions. 
 
 
Box A.2: Classification of expense by Function of Government 
 
source: GFSM 2001, page 76 
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Table A.1. Conversion of 1986 GFS data into the 2001 GFS format (Source: Authors based on GFSM 2001 and 1986) 
   2001 GFS CLASSIFICATION   1986 GFS CATEGORY 
             
IMF DATABASE 
CODE(S) 
= 1 Cash Receipts from operating activities = A.I Total revenue and grants   1 = 81…zg  
  (taxes, Social contribution, Grants, others Receipts including nontax revenue)    
+ 31.2 Sales of nonfinancial assets    
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
    (Fixed assets, Strategic stocks, Valuables, Nonproduced assets)     
(tax and nontax revenue, Grants, and Capital revenues 
including the sales of nonfinancial assets i.e. sales of  fixed 
capital assets, stocks, and land and intangible assets -A13.; 
A14.; A15.)   
= 7 Total outlays  = B.I Total expenditure   7 = 82..zg 
  2   cash payments for operating activities (=C.II)    
  
(Compensation of employees, Purchases of goods and services, Interest, Subsidies, Grants, 
Social Benefits, Other payments) 
     
  31.1 Purchases of nonfinancial assets      
   (Fixed assets, Strategic stocks, Valuables, Nonproduced assets)     
(Expenditure on goods and services including 
Compensation of employees, Interest, Subsidies, 
Capital expenditure including the purchases of 
nonfinancial assets i.e. Acquisition of  fixed capital 
assets, stocks, and land and intangible assets - C4.; 
C5.; C6.)     
= 701 General public services = B1. General public services 701 = 82a..zg + 
  
(Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs, Foreign 
economic aid, General Services, Basic Research, R&D General public services, Public debt 
transactions, others) 
+ B14. Expenditures not classified by major group   82k..zg 
 
7017 Public debt transactions B14.0.1 Expenditure on interest payments 7017 = 82pa.zg 
+ 702 Defense + B2. Defense affairs and services 702 = 82b..zg 
    (Military defense, Civil defense, Foreign military aid, R&D defense, others)           
+  Transport and Communication + B12. Transport and Communication     
 7045 Transport (Road, Water, Railway, Air, Pipeline and others)      82hi.zg    
 7046 Communication        
7045+ 
7046 = 
   * 
+ 706 Housing and community amenities + B7. 706 = 82f..zg 
    (Housing and Community development, Water supply, Street lighting, R&D , others)     
Housing and community amenity affairs and 
services     
+ 707 Health + B5. 707 = 82d..zg 
    
(Medical products, appliances, and Equipment, Outpatient services, Hospital services, 
Public health services, R&D health, others) 
    
Health affairs and services 
    
+ 708 Recreation, culture, and religion + B8. 708 = 82g..zg 
   
(Recreational and sporting services, Cultural services, Broadcasting and publishing 
services, Religious and other community services, R&D, others) 
    
Recreational, cultural, and religious affairs and 
    
+ 709 Education + B4. 709 = 82c..zg 
  
(Pre-primary and primary, Secondary, Postsecondary nontertiary, Tertiary Education, 
Subsidiary services to educations, R&D, others) 
  
Education affairs and services 
   
+   Others           
 703 Public order and safety  B3. Public order and safety affairs 703 = 82ac.zg 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
 704 Economic affairs (others than Transport and Communication)  B9- Economic affairs  704 = 82h..zg-
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13 82hi.zg 
 705 Environmental protection  B7.3 Sanitary affairs and services 705 = * 
  710 Social protection   B6. Social security and welfare affairs and services 710 = 82e..zg   
 See the GFS Manual 2001 "Classification of GFSM 1986 data to the GFSM 2001 Framework", October 2002 for a full explanation.   
* Not separately available from, or does not exist, in the 1986 GFS classifications.      
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According to the GFS manual (GFSM) 2001, COFOG is applied to government 
expense and the net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. In total, these are referred as 
government outlays (see box A1). With this definition, the GFSM 1986's category of 
Total expenditure (category B.I) is only a proxy for total outlays (category 7) because 
Total expenditure includes expenses plus the acquisition of nonfinancial assets and 
no details exist in GFSM 1986 to classify the sales of fixed assets, stocks, and land and 
intangible assets (categories A.13, A14, A15) to the GFSM 2001/COFOG categories.27 
 
However, observation of the data in the GFSM 2001 framework reveals that total 
outlay is still equal--on a cash reported basis--to "cash payments for operating 
activities + purchases of nonfinancial assets" (column 1 in table A2: 56 cases out of 77 
correspond to this definition in 1995) instead of "operating activities + net cash 
outflow from investment in nonfinancial assets" assets"(column 2 in table A2: 1 case 
out of 77 corresponds to this definition). 
 
 
Table A2. Computation of "Total Outlays" in the GFSM 2001 data  
for 1995 and 2000 
 
year (1) (2) (3) (4)  
1995 56 1 12 8 77 
 73% 1% 16% 10% 100% 
2000 24 9 7 6 46 
 52% 20% 15% 13% 100% 
 
(1) Case 1: Outlays= cash payments for operating activities + purchases of nonfinancial assets 
(2) Case 2: Outlays= cash payments for operating activities + net cash outflow in nonfinancial assets 
(3) Status quo: both cases 1 and 2 are correct as sales on nonfinancial assets are nil. 
(4) Both cases 1 and 2 are not correct, but case 1 is always clearly closest to the correct amount of 
outlays. 
 
Source: authors’ computation, Computed on available data for the Budgetary Central government, 
from the "statement of sources and uses of cash" and the "outlays by functions of governments, GFS 
2001 CD-ROM 
 
 
 
Hence, we take into account this definition of total outlays in GFSM 2001 and adapt 
the table of the GFSM 1986 conversion as reported in Table A.1, i.e. with the purchase 
of nonfinancial assets included in Total outlays and sales in nonfinancial assets 
included in Total Revenue, in both GFSM 1986 and 2001. Note that whatever the 
definition of outlays and revenue,  the overall Deficit/surplus are still defined as 
Outlays minus Revenue, i.e. the net cash inflow from operating activities minus the 
net cash outflow from investment in “nonfinancial assets". 
 
                                                 
27 See pages 18-19, Classification of GFSM 1986 Data to GFSM 2001 framework, October 2002. 
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A.1.2. Data Consistency Check for the Change in GFS series. 
Figure A.1. Data consistency check for the change in GFS series (check for break in the data between 1989 and 1990) 
(a) Annual growth rate of total public expenditure in GDP (b) Public deficit in GDP 
  
(c) Annual growth rate of Education expenditure in total public 
expenditure 
(d) Annual growth rate of Transport and Communication expenditure in 
total public expenditure 
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Source: Authors’ computation from GFS data. 
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A.1.3. Sector and Data Availability in the Fiscal Database 
 
 
Finally, Table A3 defines the sample used to compute the fiscal event. We keep only 
the countries/years for which data are available, on a cash basis of recording, on total 
revenue, total expenditure, and disaggregated expenditure by function i.e. 
expenditure in General public services / Public debt transaction/ Defense/ Transport 
and Communication / Housing and Communities / Health / Recreation, Culture and 
Religion/ Education / Others (see definition in details in Annex A.1.1). 
 
We use data at the consolidated central government sector level (CG) and at the 
budgetary central government level (BA) if the former is not available over the 
studied period. For each country included in the fiscal database (see column 1), we 
indicate in column 4 the corresponding government level we use. Note that 73% of 
the countries have fiscal variables reported at the CG level which corresponds to 86% 
of the observations. 
 
For each country, the maximum number of observations is 34 (from 1972 to 2005). 
We report in column (2) the number of observations actually available for each 
country. On average, by country, the GFS database includes only 14 years over the 34 
potential ones (40%). We also indicate in column (5) and (6) the first and last years 
available, and if the series within this period is continuous (in which case there are 
zero missing value) or if some years are missing (and if so how many). This 
information is in column 7. 
 
The resulting “fiscal” database used in the study then includes the 140 countries 
(including 22 High Income OECD countries) over 1972-2005 with 1904 observations 
(which represents 40% of the potential number of observations, 140*34=4760). 
 
Note that for OECD countries, data in recent years are rarely available. This is due to 
the fact that these countries have recently changed from a cash to an accrual basis of 
recording with no possible conversion.  
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Table A.3. Fiscal Sample 
 
Available years b) 
Country 
Country 
Code 
# Obs 
Reported 
Sector a) 
First Last 
Missing 
Values 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
High Income OECD countries        
AUSTRALIA* 193 27 CG 1972 1998 0 
AUSTRIA* 122 23 CG 1972 1994 0 
BELGIUM* 124 17 CG 1972 1988 0 
CANADA* 156 32 CG 1974 2005 0 
DENMARK 128 28 CG 1972 1999 0 
FINLAND* 172 26 CG 1972 1997 0 
FRANCE* 132 19 CG 1975 1993 0 
GERMANY* 134 23 CG 1972 1994 0 
GREECE* 174 10 CG 1972 1981 0 
ICELAND* 176 26 CG 1972 1997 0 
IRELAND* 178 13 CG 1982 1994 0 
ITALY* 136 14 CG 1973 1988 2 
JAPAN* 158 3 CG 1991 1993 0 
LUXEMBOURG* 137 24 CG 1972 1995 0 
NETHERLANDS* 138 21 CG 1974 1994 0 
NEW-ZEALAND 196 11 BA 1991 2001 0 
NORWAY* 142 26 CG 1972 1999 2 
SPAIN* 184 22 CG 1972 1994 1 
SWEDEN* 144 28 CG 1972 1999 0 
SWITZERLAND* 146 25 CG 1972 2002 6 
UNITED-KINGDOM* 112 28 CG 1972 1999 0 
UNITED-STATES* 111 29 CG 1972 2000 0 
Developing countries       
AFGHANISTAN 512 3 BA 2003 2005 0 
ALBANIA 914 7 BA 1995 2004 3 
ALGERIA 612 6 BA 1994 1999 0 
ARGENTINA 213 30 CG 1972 2001 0 
AZERBAIJAN 912 6 CG 1994 1999 0 
BAHAMAS* 313 16 BA 1990 2005 0 
BAHRAIN* 419 32 CG 1974 2005 0 
BANGLADESH 513 4 BA 2001 2004 0 
BARBADOS* 316 18 CG 1972 1989 0 
BELARUS 913 13 CG 1992 2005 1 
BELIZE 339 8 BA 1990 1997 0 
BENIN 638 3 CG 1977 1979 0 
BHUTAN 514 21 CG 1982 2004 2 
BOLIVIA 218 15 CG 1987 2001 0 
BOTSWANA 616 7 BA 1990 1996 0 
BRAZIL 223 19 CG 1972 1998 8 
BULGARIA 918 18 CG 1988 2005 0 
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Available years b) 
Country 
Country 
Code 
# Obs 
Reported 
Sector a) First Last 
Missing 
Values 
BURKINA-FASO 748 15 CG 1973 1989 2 
BURUNDI 618 11 CG 1973 1996 13 
CAMEROON 622 13 CG 1976 1994 6 
CENTRAL-AFR.-REP. 626 1 CG 1981 1981 0 
CHILE 228 15 CG 1972 1986 0 
CHINA,P.R. 924 13 BA 1990 2004 2 
CHINA-MACAO 546 3 CG 1996 1998 0 
COLOMBIA 233 8 BA 1990 1997 0 
COMOROS 632 1 CG 1984 1984 0 
CONGO-DEM-REP-OF 636 17 CG 1972 1997 9 
CONGO-REPUBLIC-OF 634 2 CG 1982 1983 0 
COSTA-RICA 238 29 CG 1972 2003 3 
CROATIA 960 15 BA 1991 2005 0 
CYPRUS* 423 26 CG 1972 1997 0 
CZECH* 935 13 CG 1993 2005 0 
DOMINICAN-REPUBLIC 243 29 CG 1973 2004 3 
ECUADOR 248 1 BA 1990 1990 0 
EGYPT 469 22 CG 1975 1997 1 
EL-SALVADOR 253 12 BA 1990 2001 0 
ESTONIA* 939 11 CG 1991 2001 0 
ETHIOPIA 644 12 BA 1990 2002 1 
FIJI 819 9 BA 1990 2005 7 
GAMBIA 648 1 BA 1990 1990 0 
GEORGIA 915 9 CG 1997 2005 0 
GHANA 652 8 BA 1990 2004 7 
GUATEMALA 258 11 BA 1990 2005 5 
HONDURAS 268 8 CG 1972 1979 0 
HUNGARY 944 19 CG 1981 1999 0 
INDIA 534 28 CG 1977 2004 0 
INDONESIA 536 31 CG 1973 2004 1 
IRAN 429 33 CG 1972 2005 1 
ISRAEL* 436 28 CG 1972 1999 0 
JAMAICA 343 6 BA 2000 2005 0 
JORDAN 439 16 BA 1990 2005 0 
KAZAKHSTAN 916 9 CG 1997 2005 0 
KENYA 664 14 BA 1991 2004 0 
KOREA, REP.* c) 542 30 CG 1972 2005 4 
KUWAIT* 443 23 CG 1972 1999 5 
KYRGYZ 917 9 BA 1993 2001 0 
LATVIA 941 12 CG 1994 2005 0 
LEBANON 446 4 CG 1993 1996 0 
LESOTHO 666 16 CG 1972 2004 17 
LIBERIA 668 15 CG 1974 1988 0 
LITHUANIA 946 8 BA 1993 2000 0 
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Available years b) 
Country 
Country 
Code 
# Obs 
Reported 
Sector a) First Last 
Missing 
Values 
MADAGASCAR 674 12 CG 1972 1997 14 
MALAYSIA 548 18 CG 1972 1995 6 
MALDIVES 556 27 CG 1979 2005 0 
MALI 678 8 CG 1976 1988 5 
MALTA 181 26 CG 1972 1998 1 
MAURITIUS 684 33 CG 1973 2005 0 
MEXICO 273 29 CG 1972 2000 0 
MOLDOVA 921 10 CG 1996 2005 0 
MONGOLIA 948 10 CG 1992 2002 1 
MOROCCO 686 24 CG 1972 1999 4 
MYANMAR 518 30 CG 1973 2002 0 
NAMIBIA 728 3 BA 2001 2003 0 
NEPAL 558 33 CG 1972 2005 1 
NETHERLANDS-ANTILLES* 353 24 CG 1972 1995 0 
NICARAGUA 278 14 CG 1972 1994 9 
NIGER 692 5 CG 1976 1980 0 
OMAN 449 12 BA 1990 2001 0 
PAKISTAN 564 8 CG 1998 2005 0 
PANAMA 283 29 CG 1973 2001 0 
PAPUA-NEW-GUINEA 853 13 BA 1990 2002 0 
PARAGUAY 288 17 CG 1972 1989 1 
PHILIPPINES 566 16 BA 1990 2005 0 
POLAND 964 7 CG 1994 2000 0 
ROMANIA 968 22 CG 1980 2001 0 
RUSSIA 922 3 CG 1999 2001 0 
SENEGAL 722 6 CG 1975 1984 4 
SEYCHELLES 718 13 CG 1993 2005 0 
SIERRA-LEONE 724 1 BA 1990 1990 0 
SINGAPORE* 576 33 CG 1972 2004 0 
SLOVAK 936 7 CG 1996 2002 0 
SLOVENIA* 961 13 CG 1993 2005 0 
SOUTH-AFRICA 199 4 BA 1995 2003 5 
SRI-LANKA 524 16 BA 1990 2005 0 
ST.-KITTS-AND-NEVIS 361 3 CG 1985 1987 0 
ST.-VINCENT-&-GRENADINES 364 2 BA 1990 1993 2 
SUDAN 732 2 BA 1998 1999 0 
SURINAME 366 6 CG 1972 1986 9 
SWAZILAND 734 2 BA 1999 2000 0 
SYRIAN-A.-REP. 463 24 CG 1972 1999 4 
TAJIKISTAN 923 4 CG 1998 2001 0 
TANZANIA 738 11 CG 1972 1985 3 
THAILAND 578 31 CG 1972 2002 0 
TONGA 866 10 CG 1980 1989 0 
TOGO 742 7 CG 1977 1987 4 
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Available years b) 
Country 
Country 
Code 
# Obs 
Reported 
Sector a) First Last 
Missing 
Values 
TRINIDAD-&-TOBAGO* 369 13 CG 1976 2004 16 
TUNISIA 744 34 CG 1972 2005 0 
TURKEY 186 25 CG 1972 1998 2 
UGANDA 746 3 BA 2001 2003 0 
UKRAINE 926 5 CG 1999 2005 2 
UNITED-ARAB-EM.* 466 3 BA 1997 1999 0 
URUGUAY 298 25 CG 1972 2000 4 
VANUATU 846 13 CG 1981 1997 4 
VENEZUELA 299 6 CG 1999 2005 1 
WEST-BANK-AND-GAZA 487 1 BA 2005 2005 0 
YEMEN 474 10 BA 1990 1999 0 
ZAMBIA 754 10 BA 1990 1999 0 
ZIMBABWE 698 19 CG 1976 1997 3 
*  means that corresponding countries are classified as a High Income country, i.e. with a 2006 GNI per capita 
(calculated using the World Bank Atlas method) greater than $11,116, Classification of July 2007 
a) Government sectors: CG  Central Government (consolidated)/ BA  Budgetary Central Government 
For EU countries listed, in line with the presentation adopted within the European Union, data on BA operations may 
include the operations of extra-budgetary units/entities. 
b) Reports the first and last years available, and if the series within this period is continuous (zero missing value) or if 
some years are missing (and how many). 
c) High income and Signed the Convention founding the OECD in December 1996 but mainly non OECD over the 
studied period. 
 
Source: Authors’ computation from GFS data. 
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A.2. CONSOLIDATED DATABASE  
 
The consolidated database is obtained by merging the fiscal database with the 
growth event database discussed below. 
 
To compute the growth event, we use the Penn World Table PWT 6.2 as our 
baseline data source. As in HPR 2005 (who use PWT 6.1 over 1950-1999), we 
eliminate all countries with fewer than 15 data points. Hence, the “growth” 
database covers 187 countries over the same period as the “fiscal database”, i.e. 
1972-2004. It includes 5380 observations which amounts to 87% of the 
potential number of observations (=6171=187 countries*33 years). 
 
Once the fiscal and growth events have been computed on their respective 
databases, we merge the two into a final dataset. This data set includes 107 
countries (84 developing countries), over 1977-2000. This leads to 1452 
observations which is 57% of the potential number (=2568=107 countries*24 
years).  
 
Tables 2, 3, 4, A1 and Figures 1 and 2 reported in the main text are computed on 
this database.  
 
For the probit estimation, since we drop all data corresponding to years 
t+2...t+4 of a growth event and due to the lack of availability for the terms of 
trade variable, the sample we use for estimating equation (1) included 104 
countries (71 “non high income” countries), over 1977-2000, and 1127 
observations (706 for the “non high income” sample). Note that there are still 
50 growth events (29 for “non high income” countries) and 73 fiscal events (54 
for “non high income” countries) in this sample, with 22 cases of fiscal events 
followed by a growth event (14 for “non high income” countries). 
 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 are computed on this smaller database. 
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A.3. FISCAL AND GROWTH EVENTS: DEFINITIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
For both growth and fiscal expenditures, the detection of events takes place over 
a horizon, n , across variables. The objective is to examine the change in the 
indicator value, 
,t nz , centered over that horizon (GDP growth or some 
component of public expenditures), that is 
, , ,t n t t n t t nz z z+ −∆ = − . Then, as in 
event analysis, and more particularly in HPR (2005), we impose several 
conditions on the change in value that variable must satisfy for an event to have 
taken place, the criteria each time being selected somewhat arbitrarily in order 
to yield enough “events” while respecting what would appear as “common 
sense” criteria. 
 
 
Growth acceleration. We start with growth which is more familiar. We follow 
quite closely HPR, though, for reasons explained below, we define duration 
periods differently. HPR use the following criteria: (i) an increase in per-capita 
growth of 2 percentage points or more (percentage points per annum, ppa), (ii) 
growth sustained for at least eight years [t;t+7], (iii) an average growth rate at 
least 3.5 percent per year during the acceleration period (n) and (iv) a post-
acceleration output exceeding the pre-episode peak level of income. Finally, 
HPR use a spline regression to detect which year gives the highest structural 
break in growth in the relevant window horizon (8 years in the case of HPR). 
Because our times series for fiscal data is shorter, we will use a shorter time-
period to define the growth episodes (n=4 instead of 7). 
 
The set-up is the following. Taking a general notation, our criterion is GDP per 
capita growth at time t  over horizon t  to t n+ ,. i.e. 
,t t ng + defined by the 
following: 
 
 ( ) ,ln * , 0, ,t i t t ny a g i i n+ += + = L  (2) 
 
and the change in the criterion function is given by the change in the estimated 
(by Ordinary Least Square, OLS) growth rate over horizon n  across that 
horizon: 
 
 
, , 1, 1ˆ ˆt n t t n t n tg g g+ − − −∆ = −  (3) 
 
An acceleration of growth will be identified when, during rapid growth episodes, 
the following conditions are all satisfied: 
 
 
{ }
,
,
ˆ
max ,
t t n
t n
t n i
g ppa growth is rapid
g ppa growth accelerates
y y i t post growth output exceeds pre episode peak
α
β
+
+
≥
∆ ≥
≥ ≤ − −
(4) 
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where ppa  is percentage points per annum, α  is minimum per capita growth 
that must be satisfied during the period (3.5 ppa for HPR and for us in our base 
case) and β  is the minimum acceleration that must be satisfied (2.0 ppa for 
HPR and for us in our base case). 
 
Since several years of events could be following one another, the timing of the 
initiation of the growth acceleration episode is chosen by fitting for each 
candidate year the following spline regression: 
 
 ( ) 0 1, 1 ,ln * * * , 1, ,t i t n t n t i t ny a g i a DE vg i DE i n n+ − − + + += + + + = − − L  (5) 
 
where DE  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the candidate event 
year. Equation (5) is estimated by OLS over each candidate year, and the 
selected event year is the one for the regression with the highest F-test (i.e. 
highest R2). 
 
Fiscal events. From the GFS data (see the annex to the paper for a more precise 
definition of variables), define primary expenditures as total fiscal expenditures 
less interest payments, i.e. as DFE TFE IP= − .  
Next, we wish to take into account the budget constraint and find a way of 
controlling for spending increases in situations of growing deficits.  Then, the 
central government budget constraint (small case variables represent variables 
expressed as a share of GDP, i.e. /dfe DFE GDP= ) is: 
 trg dfe ip def≡ + +  (6) 
with trg the total revenue and grants in % of GDP,28 and def the fiscal 
deficit/surplus in % of GDP.29 
  
Using the same notation as above to define the length over which changes in the 
ratio of primary spending takes place: 
 
 ( ) , * , 0, ,t i t t ndfe a dfe i i n+ += + = L  (7) 
 
An acceleration in primary spending will be identified when there is an increase 
in the estimated growth of ratio of primary expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP, dfe∆ .  For an acceleration to qualify as an ‘event’, one must control for the 
evolution of the deficit when there is one (again keep in mind that the deficit 
here is from the GFS and only includes the central government). Define now 
,t t ndef + as the average deficit (as a percentage of GDP) over the period so that 
the change in deficit between two adjacent periods is  
 
 
, , 1, 1t n t t n t n tdef def def+ − − −∆ ≡ −  (8) 
 
                                                 
28 See detailed definition in annex A.1. 
29 def<0 is defined as a deficit and def>0 a surplus. 
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We impose two criteria for an increase in ratio of primary expenditures growth, 
dfe∆ , to qualify as a fiscal “event”. The first criterion deals with situations when 
the increase in expenditures takes place from a situation of fiscal deficit. Take 
then the case of a fiscal deficit in the period preceding the candidate fiscal event 
and let δ  be the selected threshold value for the central government deficit. In 
our sample, for developing countries, the average (central government) fiscal 
deficit was 2%. So, if increasing primary expenditures take place from a 
situation of deficit, i.e. when ( )1, 1t n tdef δ− − − < , we require an improvement in 
the fiscal deficit of λ (with 0λ = corresponding to a situation of  no 
deterioration) . This gives rise to the condition on the second line of (9). 
 
 
,
, 1, 1
, 1, 1
, 0t t n
t n t n t
t t n t n t
dfe discretionary expenditure growth is rapid
def if def a deficit situation must improve
def if def a limit on a growing deficit
φ φ
λ δ
γ δ
+
− − −
+ − − −
∆ ≥ >
∆ ≥ <

≥ >
 (9) 
 
In the case of a more favorable initial situation (i.e. ( )1, 1t n tdef δ− − − > ), we wish 
to exclude events where the shift to a deficit results in an average deficit in 
excess of γ  during the period ( ),t t n+ . This is the criterion in the third line of (9)
. 
 
A numerical example inspired from the selection of events discussed below will 
give an idea of plausible values for the parameters of interest. For the 
developing countries in the sample, average primary government expenditures 
were about 24% of GDP over the period 1972-2000. Take 4n = , i.e. regressions 
over a five year period. Suppose that primary expenditure ratio was constant 
over the previous five year period. Then, if we choose 1φ =  as the cut-off point 
to define an ‘acceleration’, to qualify expenditures would have had to increase by 
at least 4 percentage points during the 5-year period, i.e. increased to 28%.30    
 
Sensitivity analysis. Recall from the main text that the objective is to end up 
with a “sufficient’” number of events that at the same time satisfy “reasonable” 
inclusion criteria. In a first step we selected parameters for growth events 
(essentially those of the preferred or “baseline” HPR selection, except for the 
‘window’ length) . More concretely, in equations (4) we choose 
{ }0.035; 0.02; maxt n iy yα β += = ≥ .  To qualify as an “event”, growth during the 
5-year window has to be at least equal to 3.5 ppa and the difference in growth 
between the two ‘windows’ has to exceed 2.0 ppa.  Call the resulting growth 
event set, the benchmark growth events.  As indicated in table A.4, row 1, this 
yields 58 growth events.  
 
                                                 
30 If previous period had an annual change of x—which could be negative--then there will be an 
event if acceleration is equal to x+4. 
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To obtain the corresponding benchmark fiscal events, we started with the above 
benchmark growth parameter set and experimented with several sets of 
plausible parameters for the fiscal conditions defined in equation (9). We settled 
for the following fiscal parameter set 0.01; 0; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = = − =  which yields 
95 fiscal events (table A.4, row 1).   
 
Under this set of parameter values, a fiscal event satisfies the following 
conditions over the relevant windows. First, an acceleration in the annual 
average growth rate of primary expenditures of 1 ppa. In addition, the cut-off 
point for deficit is set at zero (i.e. 0δ = ). Then in a situation of initial deficit, any 
increase in primary expenditures cannot be accompanied by an increase in 
deficit ( 0λ =  ) . And, in a situation of initial surplus, an increase in primary 
expenditures cannot lead to a deficit in excess of 2% of GDP over the period 
( 0.02γ = − ).   
 
 
An inspection of the sensitivity analysis results in table A.4 does not lead to 
particularly surprising results since tighter conditions always lead to less 
qualifying events. Interestingly, however, the ratio of fiscal events followed by a 
growth event remains in the 22%-28% range, except when we have imposed that 
the fiscal event is throughout accompanied by a fiscal surplus in which case 41% 
of fiscal events are followed by a growth event (row 8). Likewise, rows 9-13 carry 
out similar sensitivity analysis for the growth event parameters.  
 
Finally, note that if we define periods of 8 years instead of 5 (n=7), the 
benchmark set of parameters leads to 52 fiscal events and 18 growth events over 
the reduced period 1980-1997.  
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Table A.4: Benchmark Events and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
   
Total number 
of events in 
Fiscal event  
    
Growth Fiscal 
Growth 
events 
preceded by a 
fiscal event 
followed by 
a growth 
event 
including the ones 
simultaneous to 
growth events 
Also  preceded 
by a growth 
event 
only 
preceded by 
a growth 
event 
w/o any 
growth 
event 
Total 
   (1) (2) (3) (3)/(1) (3) (3)/(2) (4) (4)/(2) (5) (5)/(2) (6) (6)/(2) (7) (7)/(2) 
Benchmark Growth Event - unchanged { }( )0.035; 0.02; maxt n iy yα β += = ≥                   
(3)+(6)+
(7)/(2) 
Fiscal Event conditions:                       
1. 0.01; 0; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = = − =  58 95 25 43.1% 25 26.3% 6 6.3% 7 7.4% 23 24.2% 47 49.5% 100% 
2. 0.005; 0; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = = − =  58 123 28 48.3% 28 22.8% 6 4.9% 6 4.9% 29 23.6% 66 53.7% 100% 
3. 0.02; 0; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = = − =  58 49 14 24.1% 14 28.6% 4 8.2% 1 2.0% 11 22.4% 24 49.0% 100% 
4. 0.02; 0; 0.02; 0.02φ λ γ δ= = = − = −  58 95 25 43.1% 25 26.3% 6 6.3% 6 6.3% 24 25.3% 46 48.4% 100% 
5. 0.01; 0.02; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = − = − =  58 107 27 46.6% 27 25.2% 7 6.5% 6 5.6% 26 24.3% 54 50.5% 100% 
6. 0.01; 0.01; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = = − =  58 81 23 39.7% 23 28.4% 5 6.2% 4 4.9% 19 23.5% 39 48.1% 100% 
7. 0.01; 0; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = = − =  ;
,
0t t nge + >  58 87 21 36.2% 21 24.1% 3 3.4% 8 9.2% 22 25.3% 44 50.6% 100% 
8. 0.01φ =  ;
,
0t t ndef + ≥  58 37 15 25.9% 15 40.5% 3 8.1% 4 10.8% 10 27.0% 12 32.4% 100% 
Fiscal Event condition unchanged ( )0.01; 0; 0.02; 0φ λ γ δ= = = − =              
Growth Event conditions:                        
9. { }0.035; 0.02; maxt n iy yα β += = ≥   58 95 25 43.1% 25 26.3% 6 6.3% 7 7.4% 23 24.2% 47 49.5% 100% 
10. { }0.02; 0.02; maxt n iy yα β += = ≥  74 95 31 41.9% 31 32.6% 5 5.3% 9 9.5% 27 28.4% 37 38.9% 100% 
11. { }0.035; 0.01; maxt n iy yα β += = ≥  70 95 28 40.0% 28 29.5% 6 6.3% 9 9.5% 25 26.3% 42 44.2% 100% 
12. { }0.02; 0.01; maxt n iy yα β += = ≥  95 95 33 34.7% 33 34.7% 6 6.3% 14 14.7% 30 31.6% 32 33.7% 100% 
13. 0.035; 0.02;α β= =  72 95 29 40.3% 29 30.5% 6 6.3% 6 6.3% 25 26.3% 41 43.2% 100% 
Source: Authors’ computation from GFS and PWT 6.2 data. 
